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The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program has been a popular tool for providing 
affordable housing in the United States over the past 30 years. Despite its popularity, 
many scholars and political leaders scrutinize the program for its role in exacerbating 
social issues, such as poverty concentration and racial segregation in urban areas. 
This article explores the role that each state’s Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) plays in 
distributing these low-income housing tax credits to developers and the ways in which 
the QAP may contribute to these social issues. Specifically, the article looks at the state 
of Missouri and the City of St. Louis as an example of where the autonomy granted to 
states to oversee credit allocation may work against the overall intentions of the LIHTC 
program and where potential reform could be successful.
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stablished  by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
program has had a prominent role in 
delivering affordable rental housing in the United 
States.  This federal program has successfully 
encouraged private developers to invest in 
affordable housing by using tax credits as an 
alternative source of project equity (MHDC, 2007).  
Since 1986, the LIHTC program has helped finance 
more than 2.4 million affordable housing units for 
low-income households and is now the largest 
federal housing production program in the United 
States (Black, 2014). Even though the supply of 
public housing continues to decline, the tax credit 
program continues to grow by about 90,000 units 
per year (Schwartz, 2008). Several states have 
made their own individual efforts to expand this 
production program and, as of 2014, sixteen states 
had enacted their own low-income housing tax 
credit programs, which supplement the federal tax 
credits.  
Despite impressive housing production numbers, 
this program does not fully address low-income 
housing issues, such as poverty concentration, 
racial segregation, and crime (Johnson, 2014). 
While several studies show that the LIHTC 
program has done a better job of deconcentrating 
poverty than other federal policy programs, 
more still needs to change (Johnson, 2014). A 
major cause for concern is the way in which 
Qualified Allocation Plans (QAP) influence the 
location of individual projects and whether or 
not their structure and format heightens some of 
the aforementioned issues. Broadly, this article 
explores the credit allocation process and the role 
of the Qualified Allocation Plan in determining the 
location of LIHTC developments. More specifically, 
it looks at the state of Missouri and the City 
of St. Louis as examples of why the autonomy 
granted to states to oversee credit allocation may 
work against the overall intentions of the LIHTC 
program.
T h e  Q u a l i f i e d  A l l o c at i o n  P l a n        
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the 
governing body responsible for allocating 
tax credits to individual states based on their 
population (Shah, 2014). Since its inception, the 
popularity of the program has caused project 
applications to exceed the number of available 
credits. Because of this, individual states play a 
large role in determining the merit of proposed 
LIHTC developments. Section 42 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the law that governs the LIHTC 
program, requires the state agency responsible 
for allocating the tax credits to create an annual 
QAP, which sets the criteria for project selection. 
The IRS considers QAPs qualified only if they 
follow procedural protocol, report situations of 
noncompliance, and allow for public comment 
when drafted annually (IRS, 2014). States can 
set individual priorities and selection criteria 
within the QAP, but Section 42 sets preferences 
for projects “serving the lowest income 
tenants,” “serving income-eligible residents 
for the longest period of time,” and located in 
federally designated priority areas as long as 
the project follows a concerted community 
revitalization plan (Gramlich, 2013, pg. 1). These 
“preferences,” as dictated by the IRS, extend as 
far as mandating that selection criteria include 
projection location, housing need characteristics, 
sponsor characteristics, public housing waiting 
lists, individuals with children, special needs 
populations, existing area housing, projects 
intended for eventual tenant ownership, energy 
efficiency, and historic nature (Gramlich, 2013).
Aside from these minimum requirements, states 
have the autonomy to decide how to define and 
measure these preferences, how or if to rank them, 
and whether or not to relate them to other state 
priorities.  Selection criteria are often heavily 
based on the staff’s opinions and knowledge 
of housing trends and on selection committee 
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members’ priorities (Shimburg Center for 
Affordable Housing, 2001). In a 2001 study of state 
allocation policies, different states used a number 
of sources to determine selection criteria, but 
all states surveyed used staff and board opinion 
(Shimburg Center for Affordable Housing, 2001). 
By comparison, only ten of 20 states used an 
advisory committee or public comment process 
to determine QAP priorities (Shimburg Center 
for Affordable Housing, 2001). Other sources of 
information can include state statutes, research 
and analysis, consolidated plans, and other state 
agencies.  Such board discretion contributes to the 
uniqueness and complexity of each state’s QAP. 
Policy-related selection criteria also play a large 
role in tailoring an individual state’s allocation 
plan. Common criteria such as family size, 
geographic location, local planning priorities, 
income targeting, and special needs are used to 
Map 1
LIHTC Properties in St. Louis. Dots are sized in proportion to the number of 
housing units in each development. Sources: ACS (2008-2013); HUD, 2015.
identify the best possible LIHTC opportunities.  
Even though Section 42 requires that states 
include many of these criteria in the selection 
process, the degree to which they prioritize them 
is influenced by what officials consider relevant 
to state-level needs.  For example, several states 
prioritize projects in economically distressed 
areas, which are variously defined as areas with 
ten percent or more of households in poverty, 
or in what the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) defines as Difficult 
Development Areas (DDA) or Qualified Census 
Tracts (QCT) (Shimburg Center for Affordable 
Housing, 2001). In order to qualify as a DDA, a 
location must have high construction, land, and 
utility costs relative to gross median income; to 
be considered a QCT, an area must have a poverty 
rate of at least 25 percent (Black, 2014). 
Private developers also play a large lobbying role 
in determining and deciphering the incentives 
within the QAP. In states with well-defined point 
systems, many developers will position their 
projects to score as many “marginal” points as 
possible. This is because essentially every project 
applying for credits will receive them, since many 
point categories act as thresholds or must-have 
points (Black, 2014). The marginal points then 
become the most contested because they often 
influence where developers choose to acquire 
property for LIHTC use or which properties they 
already own and will attempt to take the LIHTC 
and turn into income- and rent-restricted housing 
(Khadduri, 2013). This process of chasing points 
reemerges every year during the QAP approval 
process.  Developers use the annual public 
process to comment extensively on changes 
that they want made to the QAP, and thus lobby 
for particular projects and to make other types 
of projects more fundable (Khadduri, 2013). 
Through this process the QAP plays a pivotal role 
in deciding where developers choose to pursue 
projects.
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C r e at i n g  L o c at i o n a l  B a l a n c e
The QAP needs to create a better balance among 
the location of LIHTC projects in order to provide 
low-income individuals with better access 
to quality-of-life amenities and to uphold the 
program’s mission of advancing fair housing 
practices in the United States.  Authors Cummings 
and DiPasquale found that the LIHTC program 
is most frequently used to provide additional 
rental housing opportunities in already-poor 
neighborhoods rather than generating affordable 
units in higher-income areas (Burge, 2011). 
If anything, current development is actually 
redirecting low-income units that private 
companies would otherwise develop in higher-
income areas.  Study findings suggest that this 
type of development does little, if anything, to 
improve neighborhood quality in the already-poor 
neighborhoods (Burge, 2011).
State agencies need to incentivize developers to 
locate projects in “high-opportunity” areas rather 
than areas or neighborhoods with high rates of 
poverty (Bray, 2011).  Currently, developers may not 
approach high-opportunity areas because they 
simply cannot meet the threshold requirements in 
the QAP due to factors such as high land and per-
unit development cost.  Reform, then, would mean 
changing the framework by transferring some of 
the 30 percent additional tax credits, also known 
as a basis boost, currently awarded to Qualified 
Census Tracts and Difficult Development Areas, to 
high-opportunity locations. 
Typically, high-opportunity areas are geographic 
areas that are served by high-quality schools 
and have access to quality transportation, jobs, 
superior health care, public services, and other 
amenities (Bray, 2011). These areas traditionally 
have less existing poverty than the traditional 
Qualified Census Tract, which means the choice-
based housing voucher program, another housing 
subsidy program, in these areas may also not be 
strong. This presents an opportunity for LIHTC 
projects to locate in neighborhoods where fewer 
residents use housing vouchers, but rather most of 
them pay high fair market rents because landlords 
prefer unsubsidized tenants (Khadduri, 2013). 
Each state agency also holds a legal responsibility 
to create locational balance among their housing
developments.  Because the LIHTC program 
is subject to the fair housing law, locational 
balance in LIHTC development falls firmly within 
the state’s obligation to “positively further fair 
housing” (Khadduri, 2013). This is not to say that 
current QAP selection criteria directly violate fair 
housing law, but rather that an opportunity exists 
to provide more integrated housing options, which 
is a direct objective stated in the Fair Housing Act 
(Khadduri, 2013). 
 Clearly, the QAP is a powerful tool. To better 
understand how one works in practice and the 
methods with which individual state QAPs are 
tailored, we turn to the State of Missouri’s QAP and, 
more holistically, its LIHTC program to understand 
the effects of credit allocation decisions, as well as 
the opportunities for reform within the tax credit 
system in general. 
Since 1986, the LIHTC has helped 
finance more than 2.4 million 
affordable housing units for 
low-income households and is 
now the largest federal housing 
production program in the United 
States.
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 As one era ended, another began with the U.S. 
government’s launch of new affordable housing 
policies such as Section 8, a tenant-based program 
that allowed low-income individuals to use 
vouchers and live where they prefer. Although 
ideally low-income individuals use vouchers to 
diversify income levels in communities, in many 
cases they have difficulty using them in high-
rent areas because the subsidies are capped at a 
percentage of fair market rent. Capped subsidies 
during the height of Project Based Section 8 
housing resulted in pockets of low-income 
housing clusters in major metropolitan regions 
across the state (Kansas City, St. Louis). Data from 
HUD shows that the number of Section 8 voucher 
recipients in St. Louis County has doubled since 
the mid-1990s and that close to five percent of the 
city’s total population lives in subsidized housing 
units (Bogan, 2014).
T h e  M i s s o u r i  S tat e  L o w - I n c o m e 
H o u s i n g  Ta x  C r e d i t  
More recently, the state has supported LIHTC 
development as the main method of providing 
affordable housing. Since the program began in 
1986, credits have funded the creation of 52,000 
housing units in the state of Missouri (Clarke, 
2014). In 1992, increased demand for affordable 
housing led to the Missouri Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit, established under Sections 135.350 to 
135.363 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (MHDC, 
2007). This credit was originally set at 20 percent 
of the federal credit, but was expanded to 40 
percent in 1993; as of 1997, the state credit matches 
the federal LIHTC on a dollar-for-dollar basis 
(Young, 2014). The result has been a significant 
increase in affordable housing production. The 
state estimates that $9.60 of economic activity 
is generated per state credit awarded. Despite 
the program’s accomplishment of creating over 
50,000 housing units, the state tax credit system 
H i s t o r y  o f  P u b l i c  H o u s i n g  i n 
M i s s o u r i
Missouri has been at the center of national 
discussions on public housing for both its 
historical ties to Pruitt-Igoe, a famed and failed 
public housing complex in north St. Louis, and 
more recent events in Ferguson, Missouri. History 
has largely dictated where the state now stands 
in its strategies for addressing issues of poverty 
concentration, racial segregation, and affordable 
housing.  
The implementation of the Housing Act of 1949 
marked the beginning of significant disinvestment 
in large metropolitan areas during the postwar 
era. Missouri offered incentives for urban renewal 
projects, subsidies for industry, and incentives 
for residents to move to the suburbs, which had 
a particularly large impact in cities like Kansas 
City and St. Louis. Both cities saw enormous 
population decline after World War II; St. Louis City 
lost an incredible 63 percent of its total population 
between 1950 and 2010, and Kansas City lost 6.7 
percent of its population over the same time 
period despite growing in size geographically (US 
Census, 2010). In an effort to lure the middle class 
back to the central city, city leaders proposed 
public housing projects like Pruitt-Igoe as a way 
to limit slum expansion and save the economic 
health of downtown real estate (Bristol, 1991). 
The result of this planning strategy was a federal 
commitment for 5,800 public housing units in St. 
Louis City, about 2,700 of which were earmarked 
for Pruitt-Igoe’s 57-acre site on the north side, a 
predominately black ghetto. Federal money was 
put toward the construction of these projects, but 
tenants’ rents were expected to supplement the 
maintenance fees. However, as vacancy rates 
increased in the first two decades, a vicious cycle 
of disinvestment began. The project’s eventual 
demolition in 1972 serves as powerful image of 
public housing failure in the United States.
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has been heavily criticized by the public and 
the government officials due to its inefficient 
spending, lack of transparency in project selection, 
and contributions to creating pockets of immense 
poverty (MHDC, 2007). 
A 2014 audit of the Missouri Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit showed that Missouri has the highest 
per capita outlay of state tax-credit authorizations 
in the nation (Young, 2014). Missouri is only one of 
two states with a per capita outlay exceeding $20, 
while six of the ten states including California, 
Massachusetts, and New York spent less than $5.14 
per capita (Young, 2014). The cause for concern is 
not the absolute figure spent on state tax credits, 
but rather the amount of money, or lack thereof, 
that is spent on actual housing construction. This 
most recent audit found that only 42 cents of 
every dollar Missouri spends on the program goes 
toward the physical construction of affordable 
housing (Bogan, 2014). The rest is lost to federal 
taxes and syndicators, and offsets the discount 
investors require when receiving the tax credits 
over a period of ten years. This current model for 
financing LIHTC development offers an effective 
interest rate of over 19 percent. The interest rate 
is so high because of the time value of money and 
the smaller pool of players looking to write down 
their state tax obligations compared to those using 
the federal credit. Additionally, using a state tax 
credit actually writes down an investor’s federal 
tax bill, which diminishes the value even further. 
State spending for the LIHTC program is so high in 
Missouri because it is one of only two states that 
do not cap the amount of authorized tax credits 
in a given time frame. Based on levels of current 
spending, the state projects that it will authorize 
$3.4 billion credits through 2020 and investors 
will redeem $2.1 billion (Montee, 2008). Therefore, 
while the state is able to produce marginally more 
housing, it does so at a cost of $61,000 per unit.
Another cause for concern about the way the state 
tax-credit system operates is that the Missouri 
Housing Development Commission (MHDC) does 
not disclose how tax credit projects are selected.  
The state follows a QAP, but Missouri is one of only 
four states that does not use some type of scoring 
system in the project evaluation and selection 
process (Montee, 2008). The MHDC received 
recommendations in both 2007 and 2008 from the 
Missouri State Auditor and the Governor’s White 
Ribbon Panel to standardize the scoring process, 
but it still has not made any changes. MHDC staff 
have stated several times that a scoring system 
is not used so as to avoid receiving applications 
from developers who try to score the most points 
Maps 2-3
Section 8 Voucher Expansion in St. Louis. Dots are sized proportionally to the 
number of rental units in which a tenant has a voucher. Source: HUD, 2015.
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possible (Montee, 2008). However, the lack of a 
scoring system prevents transparency and adds a 
layer of subjectivity to the whole selection process.
Not only are credits allocated at the sole discretion 
of the MHDC, but the commission also does not 
disclose project cost information to the public 
until after projects are approved. This means that 
even though the state has the highest per capita 
outlay for tax credit housing in the United States, 
the Missouri public does not see the total cost 
comparison amongst all project applications, 
and never sees the projected project cost for 
applications not selected.  
Taken together, these transparency issues have 
strengthened the perception that the MHDC is 
heavily swayed by campaign contributions and 
political influence during the project selection 
process (Montee, 2008). The State Auditor and 
the state’s Ethics Commission have looked into 
this situation on several occasions and cited the 
difficulty of matching and identifying the source 
of campaign contributions as the reason this 
speculation has been neither officially confirmed 
nor denied (Montee, 2008). With the amount of 
private money invested in affordable housing, 
however, the process becomes quite difficult to 
change at the state level. Bills introduced in the 
state legislature to scale back Missouri’s program 
have died each of the past four years, with no 
current proposal on the table to make any changes 
(Young, 2014).
Missouri’s QAP has also come under intense 
scrutiny in recent months because of the way it 
implicitly encourages poverty concentration. In 
addition to providing a basis boost to Qualified 
Census Tracts, the Missouri QAP also requires 
developers to submit a market study dated within 
six months of the application due date (MHDC, 
2013). A contested metric in these market studies 
is the capture rate of the proposed development, 
which is required under Development 
Characteristics §3b of the QAP.  The capture rate 
determines the demand for an individual project 
based on a given area.  This means that if there are 
more individuals living within the primary market 
area who qualify for the proposed development, 
the result will be a more favorable capture rate. 
Because the MHDC does not disclose how it scores 
different development characteristics, a developer 
is left to maximize the project’s metrics, which 
includes the capture rate (Clarke, 2014). 
Ferguson
St. Louis County
St. Louis City
Median Household 
Income under $10k
Living in Section 8 One-parent 
Households
African 
American
20% 50% 57% 99%
Census Tract 2119
Map 4
Demographic information from Census Tract 2119 in Ferguson, Missouri. 
Sources: St. Louis Post-Dispatch; ACS (2008-2013).
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The result of the QAP’s ambiguity has led 
to speculation that the LIHTC program has 
contributed to pockets of severe poverty in the 
state’s major metropolitan areas. The St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, with data courtesy of the MHDC, 
recently published a series of maps showing the 
relationship between the incidence of low-income 
housing and median household income in the St. 
Louis area. The most noticeable cluster of low-
income housing falls in an area near the famed 
Pruitt-Igoe site in North St. Louis, which also 
happens to include the city of Ferguson. Within 
one of Ferguson’s census tracts, 20 percent of 
the population lives in Section 8 housing, over 
50 percent of households have median incomes 
of less than $10,000, 57 percent are one-parent 
households, and 99 percent are African-American. 
Two of St. Louis’ largest LIHTC projects are within 
blocks of each other, together totaling over 774 
units. The QAP may not directly cause this 
concentration of poverty, but the lack of a scoring 
system makes this area desirable for development 
according to a number of the plan’s metrics.
S tat e  R e f o r m
At the state level, the MHDC and the Missouri 
State Legislature could reform the LIHTC program 
in several ways without compromising the 
organization’s mission to strengthen communities 
through the development and preservation of 
affordable housing (MHDC, 2007). Of primary 
concern is the need to cap the number of credits 
or increase the value of the state credit so more 
money is spent on the actual construction of 
affordable housing. One possibility, suggested 
by Governor Jay Nixon’s low-income housing 
panel, is to cut the credit’s payback period from 
ten years down to five. This would increase the 
buying power of the credit and, as the commission 
reported, fund 30 percent more housing units 
for the same amount of money (MHDC, 2007). 
Alternatively, five bills in the Missouri House and 
Senate in the past two years have considered 
capping tax credit authorizations, but none of 
these have passed. A more politically feasible 
solution might be a technical restructuring of 
the credit, which would minimize federal tax 
implications for investors and lower the effective 
interest to a more reasonable level (Montee, 2008).
The second tier of necessary reform comes in 
the process of project selection. A uniform and 
transparent scoring system provides a level 
of consistency and cross-comparability when 
evaluating both proposed and selected projects 
(Montee, 2008). Additionally, the MHDC needs 
to make more information, such as proposed 
project costs, available to the public before project 
selection. Together, these two recommendations 
eliminate the possibility for political influence in 
project selection and allow the public to engage 
with and respond to the process for prioritizing 
new LIHTC development. 
Lastly, the state should revise the QAP to help 
deconcentrate poverty and create more mixed-
income communities. Missouri currently 
gives basis boosts to projects in “high-growth” 
areas, but this ignores issues of access to high-
quality schools and public services. Assessing 
a project’s strength on accessibility to transit, 
schools, and other amenities would serve a more 
effective purpose than looking at areas with high 
concentrations of poverty as dictated by the QCT’s 
definition. 
This most recent audit found 
that only 42 cents of every 
dollar Missouri spends on the 
program goes into the physical 
construction of affordable 
housing (Bogan, 2014). 
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The MHDC also needs to limit LIHTC development 
in Qualified Census Tracts and Difficult 
Development Areas that do not truly possess 
a community revitalization plan. Currently, 
developers can point to outdated master plans as 
fulfilling the necessary requirements for such a 
plan, even if communities do not actively adhere 
to these plans. The solution is to either eliminate 
the community revitalization plan requirement 
or mandate that communities update their 
plans more frequently. In total, the goal of these 
statewide reforms is to increase the efficiency 
of the tax credit program through both fiscal and 
social responsibility, as well as increase total 
transparency. 
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located and how they affect the neighborhoods.  
It is the responsibility of these designated state 
agencies to effectively integrate affordable 
housing within our communities and establish 
a transparent selection process. The extent to 
which they can accomplish these changes will 
most certainly affect the longevity of the LIHTC 
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